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PROTECTING THE CONSUMER: 
BUYER AGENCY IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 
by 
Robert D. King* 
I. Introduction 
The single most important investment for most Americans is the purchase of a home. 
The decision to buy a home requires substantial financial consideration. Similarly, one who 
sells a home must consider the financial consequences. It is inappropriate, therefore, that such 
an important financial transaction is in many instances conducted in a manner which is 
inconsistent with prevailing notions of agency theory and which does not aocurately reflect the 
Wlderstanding of the buyer, the seller, and the real estate professional. 
The typical residential real estate transaction promotes this inconsistency through the 
use of"listing brokers" and "cooperating or selling brokers," the latter of whom are deemed to 
be "sub-agents" of the listing broker.1 In this transaction, the seller designates a broker to act 
as his or her exclusive agent in marketing the property. A listing agreement setting forth the 
of the parties is executed.2 This broker is referred to as the "listing broker," and is 
legally recognized as the agent of the seller in the sale of the property.3 The listing agreement 
typically requires the listing broker to place the listing in the local Muhiple Listing Service 
("MLS"). TID:ough the MLS, selling brokers learn that the property is for sale and are advised 
of the conditions and terms of the offer to selL The selling brokers who market the property to 
prospective buyers are deemed sub-agents of the listing broker and, consequently, sub-agenlS 
of the seller, to whom they owe a fiduciary obligation. 4 
The typical real estate sale involves the prospective buyer contacting the sub-agent and 
requesting that the sub-agent assist the buyer in locating suitable property that is for sale. The 
reviews properties listed for sale in the MLS and presents them to the buyer for 
consideration. If the buyer decides to bid on a property, the sub-agent then prepares the 
buyer's offer to purchase, often after having counselled the buyer on the purchase bid as 
compared with similar properties in the area. As negotiations with the seller over the terms of 
the proposed sale continue, the sub-agem often negotiates on behalf of the buyer.5 
*Professor ofBus.iness Law, The Richard Stockton College of New Jersey 
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The close relationship between the selling broker and the buyer implies that the selling 
broker is the buyer's agent. In filet, in a survey conducted by the Federal Trade Commission 
("FTC"), 67% of buyers surveyed stated that they relied on the advice of a listing or selling 
broker, including advice concerning the valuation of the property. As might be expected, the 
typical buyer assumes that he or she is represented by the selling broker. Approximately 71% 
of buyers surveyed in the FTC Report believed that the selling broker was the agent of the 
buyer.6 Indeed, the entire selling process, when accomplished through the use of a selling 
broker, supports this assumption. In fact, most selling brokers see themselves as representing 
the buyer.7 The entire range of activities which transpire from the moment the buyer steps into 
the selling broker's office until the buyer is handed the keys to the new residence suggests that 
the selling broker represents the buyer. 
Notwithstanding the sub-agent's apparent representation of the buyer in identifying, 
valuing, bidding for and negotiating with the seller over the property, the selling broker, as a 
sub-agent, is considered the agent of the seller. 3 This agency scheme is confusing to the 
average real estate purchaser and inconsistent with the actions of both the buyer and the selling 
broker. Moreover, the seller too is victimized by the sub-agency principle. Sellers who use 
due care in selecting a listing broker as a sales agent may nonetheless become liable in tort to 
the buyer for any misreresentation of including the sub-agents about whom the seller 
knows litt1e or nothing. 
The pUIJX>se of this article is to identify the weaknesses in the sub-agent rule; examine 
the principal ahematives to sub-agency; and, recommend a form of buyer's agency which will 
comport with the realities of the real estate sale process, offer protection to the consumer, 
particularly the buyer, and do as little damage to the existing methodology of real estate sales 
as posstble. 
II. The Weaknesses Of Sub-agency In Residential Real Estate 
A typical home sale involves a seller, a buyer, and two real estate brokers: the listing 
broker and the selling broker. 10 The contractual agency relationship is created by the seller's 
execution of a listing contract. Contained within the agreement is the seller's consent to the 
placement of the property in the :MLS.11 The MLS serves as a quasi-public market for 
residential real estate transactions whereby the listing and other relevant information about the 
property is made available to all brokers who subscnbe to the service.12 Moreover, 
participation in the MLS by the seller is interpreted as consent to the creation of subagents.13 
The listing agreement is a unilateral contract by the seller to pay the commission if the property 
is sold according to the terms of the listing agreemem.14 
Without a doubt, it is clear that an :MLS listing benefits the parties to the proposed 
transaction. The :MLS listing benefits the seller by increasing the universe of prospective 
buyers aware that the property is for sale. Similarly, the :MLS provides exposure to the 
maximum number of brokers in the area, assuring that in the event the listing broker is unable 
or unwilling to market the property actively, the seller may find another listing broker. The 
listing broker benefits from the MLS listing because it better enables him or her to bring an 
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offer to buy to the seller within the terms of the listing agreement, thereby increasing the 
likelihood that the listing· broker will receive at least some portion of the cormnission. 15 The 
.MLS listing procedure also benefits the selling broker by increasing the inventory of properties 
available to show the buyer. And finally, the buyer benefits from the broker's affiliation with 
the Ml...S since the .MLS provides the buyer wtth a catalog of similar properties in the 
having the qualities that the buyer is seeking. 
The benefits afforded by the MLS, including the efficiencies related to seller liquidity, 
valuation for the buyer and the seller, and the aggregation of inventory from which the buyer 
may choose, all suggest that the MLS system should be maintained. It is, however, the notion 
of sub-agency cormected to the MLS which needs to be abolished. As one commentary noted, 
"Even though theNAR [National Association ofReahors] urges and promotes this subagency 
theory, the agency relation between the seller and the cooperating [selling] broker 'bas led to 
much misunderstanding and confusion regarding the broker's proper relationship to the buyers 
among the general public, the real estate industry, and the legal profession.' It should not be 
the law."16 
When brokers become members of the MLS they agree to pool listings and share 
oorniimsions. Under the NAR framework, placing the listing in the MLS "constitutes an offer 
of subagency by the listing broker to other [MLS] members to procure a buyer in exchange for 
a percentage of the sale commiss.ion."17 In the typical transaction utilizing the :MLS, the selling 
broker fimctions as the agent of the listing broker and, thereby, is deemed the sub-agent of the 
seller.18 Consequently, both the listing and the selling broker stand in a fiduciary relationship to 
the seller.19 
While it is clear to the parties and indeed makes sense that the listing broker is the 
agent of the seller and, therefore, stands in a fiduciary relationship to him or her, it is generally 
contrary to the beliefs and reasonable expectations of the parties that the selling broker is also 
the agent of the seller. As corrnnentators have suggested, 
Most buyers and sellers are tmaware of the true legal relationship between them and 
the brokers under the MLS structure. The sellers do not understand the listing 
agreements and the consent to subagency .... Sellers are not infonned to the potential 
liability for the conduct of agents and subagents. The buyer does not know that secrets 
revealed may be divulged by the [selling] broker under the legal duty owed to the 
seller.20 
And further, 
[E]ven experienced real estate brokers are not fully aware of the agency relationships 
created in real estate transactions, particularly those involving MLS, nor can they be 
certain of the extent of their duties and liabilities. If experienced real estate brokers are 
not sure of their own agency status, the average homebuyer and seller, who may be 
involved in a real estate trnnsaction only two or three times during their lifutimes, 
probably will not know who represents whom and what respotlSlbilities each bas.21 
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Bm it is the buyer, who under sub-agency is not legally represented by a real estate agent, who 
is the most vulnerable. Virtually every aspect of the relationship between the buyer and the 
selling agent suggests that the selling agent represents the buyer. Typically, the buyer, acting as 
a principal, initiates the contact with the selling agent and controls the entire venture, and 
through b.islher actions manifests an intent that the selling agent act on hislh.er beha1f.22 Among 
the actions indicating the buyer's belief that the selling agent acts on hWher behalf are the 
buyer's reliance on the expertise and counsel of the selling agent "'ith regard to issues such as 
the market value of the prospective purchase, financing terms, inspection and repair 
procedures, and the condition of the property. Furthermore, the buyer is often requested to 
reveal his/her financial position to the selling agent in order fur the agent to "qualify" the buyer 
for financing purposes and to allow the selling agent to select property listings which the buyer 
can afford.23 Indeed, buyers often fuel so comfortable with selling agents that they reveal the 
highest price they are willing to pay for a property. Clearly, the relationship between the buyer 
and selling agem suggests that the selling agent is acting on the buyer's behalf.24 
The selling agent's actions also suggest that the selling agent is acting as the agent of 
the buyer. As one connnentator noted: 
... the selling agent will locate and show property to the buyer which meets the buyer's 
specifications. This action creates the impression that the selling agent is working for 
the buyer. Then, once the buyer is interested in a property, the selling agent will assist 
the buyer in determining an offer price, provide financing information, and accompany 
the purchaser in a final "walk through." Agajn, these actions would suggest an intent 
on the part of the selling agent to act as the buyer's representative?5 
Notwithstanding the plethora of indications that the selling agent is the agent of the 
buyer, the rule of sub-agency holds that the selling agent is the agent of the seller. This means 
that the broker "owes his principals an obligation of utmost fidelity and good fil.ith."26 The 
element of "good :fuith" includes a legal, ethical, and moral responsibility to obtain for the 
principal, the seller, the best bargain and tenns that his/her skill, judgment and diligence can 
achieve.27 
In spite of the sub-agent rule's apparent shortcomings for the buyer, some 
commentators have nonetheless maintained that the rule actually benefits the buyer. The 
Colorado Supreme Court, for example, concluded that the buyer is actually protected as <!-
result of the sub-agency re1ationship.28 
Since both real estate agents are agents of the seller, the seller may become liable to the 
buyer in tort for any misrepresentation of his agent through the ratification doctrine. 
Such liability allows the remedy of rescission against the seller. If there is no agency 
relationship between the seller and the selling broker, but the agency relationship is 
between the buyer and the selling broker, this remedy of rescission is no longer 
available to the buyer because the ratification doctrine would not be applicable, and the 
buyer's only recourse may be a suit against the broker for damages. 29 
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I l t 
The continuation of sub-agency as the preferred interpretation of the relationship between the 
buyer and the selling broker also avoids the problems created by dual agency. Dual agency 
arises when both the seller and buyer are represented by the same agency.30 Problems of 
conflict of interest are immediately apparent. Although the disclosure of dual agency and the 
written consent of both principals, the buyer and seller, can ostellSlbly avoid the charge of 
conflict of interest, the question remains regarding the benefits to the consumer. As one 
commentator noted: 
It's no problem ... if an agency attempts to [represent both the buyer and sellerJ so long 
as all parties agree to it. The agent involved simply slips into neutral territory, the finns 
say, and becomes a dual favoring either seller or buyer but just attempting to 
bring them together. 
Critics of dual agency say that point of view is hogwash, that agents will 
knowingly or unknowingly do whatever is necessary to make a deal 31 
ill. Alternatives to Sub-agency 
The obvious deficiencies in sub--agency began to attract the attention of commentators 
during the mid-1980s. 32 The typical response to the objection that the sub-agent rule leaves the 
seller vulnerable and buyer umepresented was that through disclosure of the workings of sub-
agency to all parties by the sales agents the consumer would be made aware and therefore able 
to protect himsel£ The disclosure contemplated can apply to an agent who wishes to represent 
more than one party in the transaction notifYing all the parties, or alternatively, an agent who 
represents only one party disclosing this fuct to the other principals. Pressure from conswner 
groups, primarily, with some help from the real estate industry itself; caused many states to 
enact laws to require disclosure by sales agents about whom he or she represents. 33 There is 
no uniformity among the however, with regard to the nature and extent of the 
disclosure. Although the majority of states today have mandatory disclosure Jaws, a study by 
the Consumer Federation of America concluded that few have disclosure requirements 
essential to meet the needs of buyers.34 The Consumer Federation of America proposed a 
four-pronged test that every disclosure should meet: 
A written staterrient, provided to the purchaser, that explains the relationship 
between the agent, the seller and the buyer. If the agent is :functioning as a "buyer's 
broker" ... that, too, must be explained. 
The disclosure must take a standard, prescnbed fonn.... Agents must be 
required to provide the disclosure to the buyer at the first "substantive contact." 
Substantial contact means any circumstance in which a buyer begins to relate 
infonnation abom the type, location or price range of the property he or she desires. 
Unwary buyers who asswne that the agent represents them can divulge valuable 
tactical infonnation early on, and then be handed a disclosure funn at the clos.ing table--
fur too late to be of any value. 
The fonns must be short, simple and to the point. Leneothy, boilerplate forms 
rarely get read. 
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Both the buyer and the agent need to sign the discloSW'e fonn, .acknowledging 
that the prescribed form was read and 1.n1derstood by the conswner.35 
Disclosure, however, does not appear to be the panacea for all the ills suggested by 
sul:ragency. As one commentator noted, " ... mere disclosure still fiWs to provide the buyer with 
adequate representation. "36 Another commentator noted that, "Limiting the disclosure solely 
to the agency relationship does not provide the consumer with information about many of the 
options available that would be helpful, though perhaps not in the best interests of the broker, 
in choosing how to market his or her property or how to locate a home that best satisfies his or 
her requirements. "37 Practical reality suggests as well that the buyer may simply not 
comprehend the significance and consequences that result from disclosure.38Does the average 
consumer understand what is meant by the phrases ":fiduciary duty" or "duty to disclose?"39 
Moreover, will disclosures s.iroply be lost on buyers who are preoccupied with all the other 
issues and paperwork attending the purchase of a home't0 
In response to the wealmesses inherent in sul:ragency, even with mandatory disclosure 
of the agency relationships, some commentators have suggested other alternatives which 
ostensibly would better protect the consumer and at the same time give legal effect to the 
intentions of the parties as manifested by their conduct. Two of the principal alternatives are 
dual agency and buyer's or seller's agency. 
As the agent of both the seller and the buyer, the dual agent owes each the duties of 
loyalty, good fuith and disclosure.41 However, since the interests of the buyer and seller are 
invariably at odds, it seems impossible for the fully d&:losed dual agent to fully represent both 
parties at the same time. Consequently, the dual agent will typically assmne the role of a 
neutral fucilitator, providing the parties with the means to obtain infonnation which they may 
need to negotiate the tenns of the purchase. The dual agent refrains from giving advice to 
either party. Moreover, since the dual agent nrust still reveal any material fucts of which he or 
she is aware, the dual agent is not likely to get too involved with either party in order to avoid 
the duty to clisclose. The buyer and seller obviously are disadvantaged by this arrangement. As 
one commentator noted: 
In fact, dual agency appears only to benefit the real estate agents. As dual agents, real 
estate agents are now free from some of the responsibilities of agency, but are still able 
to collect both the listing and sales corrnnissions. Meanwhile, both the buyer and seller 
are left to represent themselves.42 
The dual agency practice is essentially the equivalent oftbe "facilitator," "mediator," or 
"middleman" approach. Tiris practice allows the real estate agent to stand in the middle of the 
transaction and releases the sales agent from the traditional :fiduciary responsibilities toward his 
or her client.43 This approach does allow for the even·haOOed treatment of both the seller and 
buyer,44 and may even reflect the real nature ofthe real estate agent's efforts, since the real 
estate agent is not generally paid unless a sale is consilll1!'l'l3ted. for example, the seller 
rejects a buyer's offer, the agent typically receives no commission. The agent may, therefore, 
attempt to persuade the seller to accept the offer even when it may not be in the seller's best 
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interest. A sample facilitator contract fonn prepared by the Greater Boston Real Estate Board 
defines the broker's duties as furnishing "'general advice concerning real estate practices and 
procedures' and assisting in 'connnunications and negotiation' between the seller and buyer 'so 
they can reach agreement between themselves.'"45 Like the criticism of the dual agency, the 
facilitator approach is criticized as giving "the consumer the worst of all possible worlds. '946 
However, it is the seller who is deemed to be the biggest loser tmder the fucilitator approach: 
"You give up the most important legal protections you have" as a seller--a binding 
"agency relationship." This :fiduciary role is a major part of the package of services 
sellers pay for in their sales commissions. . .. Signing a :facilitator agreement means "you 
throw away all that" ... but pay the same.47 
Buyer's agency or seDer's agency, or a combination ofboth, is the other most :frequently 
suggested alternative to sub-agency. Some real estate brokerage firms have recently decided to 
add formal representation of buyers, or buyer's agency: to their offered services.43 Some 
commentators argue, however, that this process is akin to dual agency and, therefore, as noted 
e.arlier, leaves the buyer and seller "vith little or no real benefits.49 The issue of dual agency 
arises most often in these situations when the buyer decides to purchase a listing of the sales 
agent's firm Again, the proponents of this process suggest that the potential fur conflict of 
interest on the part of the agent can be deah with through disclosure. 5° 
Obviously, :firms that specialize in providing either buyer's brokerage or seller's 
brokerage, but not both, avoid the potential for dual agency suggested by the above-
mentioned. Firms specializing in seller's agency provide essentially the same services as the 
seller receives under sulragency. The seller, however, would presumably not be.appointing 
sub-agents and would benefit by not being liable fur the sub-agent's misrepresentations and 
misdeeds.51 The buyer, on the other hand, is clearly a beneficiary of buyer's agency. Whereas 
buyers are 1.n1represented in the typical sub-agency sale process, in the buyer's agency mode the 
buyer has an agent representing him or her exclusively. Issues which once were thought to 
doom the utility and practicality of buyer's agency, such as the buyer's agent's splitting the 
listing agent's commission from the seller and the apparent unavailability of the MLS to buyer's 
agents, have been resolved. The :fuct that the buyer's agent may be splitting a commission paid 
by the seller with the listing agent is no longer viewed as determining the agent's principal. 52 
Moreover, the availability of the MLS to buyer's agents as been agreed to by the NAR53 As 
one commentator noted, "In 1976 when the NAR defined the :MLS as a 'means of 
disseminating infOrmation,' the California Supreme Court ruled that theNAR couldn't restrict 
:MLS access to Realtors."54 Buyer's agents benefit the buyer by allowing the buyer access not 
only to all the homes listed in the MLS (where the buyer's agent will typically split the 
commission with the listing agent) but also to homes that are fur sale by owners (where the 
buyer's agent may negotiate a fee beforehand with the sellers or arrange for the buyer to pay a 
fee). Furthermore, buyer's agents claim that they are free to render an honest assessment of a 
home to the buyer since they are not agents of the seller. 
Ahhough buyer's agency has been touted by connnentators as the wave of the future, 55 
and most barriers to its implementation have been removed, it bas not to date caught on. Some 
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of the reasons why the idea ofbuyer's agency has not caught fire with the pub!¥; relate to the 
fact that the established real estate industry, as represented by NAR, have not been generally 
supportive. While the NAR has given some superficial support for the idea of buyer's agency, 
or at least has not fotmally attempted to preclude its development, 56 in reality, the rank and file 
in the industry have not been supportive.57 The so-called "traditionalists" argue that buyer 
representation is not necessary since umer the Reahors'Code of Ethics, they must treat both 
seller and buyer fairly. Moreover, the traditionalists bristle at the of sharing 
commissions with buyer's agents. 58 Buyers too have been slow to embrace the idea of buyer's 
rurency. Buyers' reluctance is based, at least in part, on the belief that the agents working with them are in fuct working for them and looking out for their interests. 59 Also, some buyers may 
believe that using a buyer's agent will cost them a fee.6° Finally, many firms fear losing part of 
the market by specializing in seller's or buyer's agency. And, they fear doing both may be a 
conflict of interest. 
IV. A Proposal To Integrate Buyer's Agency Into the Existing Mechanism for Real Estate 
Sales 
Dominance of the sulragent rule in the sale of residential real estate today indicates that 
the use ofbuyer and seller agency on a large scale basis is not likely to occur. For well over a 
decade sulragency has been roundly criticized fur its thllure to protect the consumer.6 l 
Notwithstanding the well-deserved criticism, the predominate method for the sale of residential 
real estate remains the traditional sub-agent methodology. The buyer remains essentially 
unrepresented, although ostellSlbly better informed of his or her inferior status. One of the 
princlpal reasons the sulragent rule dominates the industry today is that it is so finnly 
entrenched, there is essentially no strong motive on the part of the industry to change it. 
Moreover) the buying public continues to labor under misconceptions as to its representation, 
or better, lack of representation. 62 
The only viable avenue for wholesale change in the existing scheme is to effect it 
through a process that does minimal damage to the existing structure. This can be 
accomplished by recognizing and implementing the intentions of the parties. As noted earlier, 
sellers do not truly understand that they are appointing every real estate broker as their agent 
when they agree to allow the listing agent to submit their property for inch.;sion in the MLS. 
Similarly, buyers do not understand that the agent with whom they have worked so diligently is 
legally bound to look out for the interests of the unknown seller. The whole sub-agent process 
is artificial and does not comport with the beliefS and expectations of the parties. Since buyer's 
agency is now at least recognized as an alternative which can be maintained through the use of 
the :MLS, and the NAR no longer requires sul:ragency as a prerequisite to its use, then the 
beliefS of the buyer and seller should be recognized. In other words, when a buyer contacts a 
real estate salesperson concerning a property advertised in any manner, the buyer should be 
able to assume that the agent will be working as the buyers agent. Only with regard to those 
listings which are with the agent's own agency should the buyer be infonned, in writing at the 
first contact, that the sales agent is the agent of the seller. This fact is most likely what the 
average buyer would believe to be the case anyway. Moreover, throughout the interactions 
between the buyer and the agent, whenever the agent shows one of the agency's own listings, 
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the buyer should be again informed that the agent is the representative of the and the 
buyer should be advised to seek independent counsel Although there may still be some 
instances where the buyer's interests may be compromised using this process, such as when the 
buyer reveals a maximum purchase price to the agent and subsequently develops an interest in 
an "in house" listing. the buyer can be made aware at the outset or the first contact with the 
agent tbat such infurma:tion should be withheld. Moreover, the typical buyer is unlikely to 
discuss the maximum price he or she is willing to pay for a property until one has been found 
which is of enough interest to consider making an offer. When the property is not an "in 
house" listing, the buyer is free to disclose such information to the agent. Clearly, this option, 
while not as perfect as the use of a straight buyer's agency, is a vast improvement over the 
which makes all sales agents the agem of the seller. While some disclosure 
with regard to "in house" listings would still be required, it is much less complex and fur more 
sensible for the average buyer to comprehend. Moreover, to utilize the concept of buyer's 
agency in this method recognizes the existence of the current structure, allows agencies to both 
list and sell real estate, and comports with the beliefs and expectations of the parties. 
V. Conclusion 
The sub-agent rule, which today remains the primary theory explaining and governing 
the relationship among the parties in residential real estate sales, does not serve the . best 
interests of consumers and should, therefore, be discontinued. 'While commentators during the 
1980s began to criticize the sub-agent rule, powerful forces, such as the NAR, fostered the 
continuation of the rule by tying use of the Multiple Listing Services to the establishment of 
sub-agency. Due to increasing criticism of the sub-agent rule, however, theNAR 
more recent years to consider the utility of alternative methods of viewing the relauonship 
among the agents, buyer, and seller. The NAR has dropped the two biggest stumbling blocks 
to the consideration of other relationships, such as buyer's agency and dual agency. The NAR 
does not insist upon sul:ragency as a prerequisite to utilizing the MLS, and it no longer argues 
that the seller's payment of a commission necessitates that all who receive a portion are by 
virtue of that filet agents of the seller. Notwithstanding the favorable conditions for a 
wholesale change in the manner in which parties to residential real estate are legally related to 
each other, very little movement has been made away from the rule of sul:ragency. Although 
there are munerous factors which may account for this slow progression, a significant fuctor 
concerns the :fuct that a movement to buyer's agency exclusively would require a major 
overhaul of the entire industry. Moreover, most real estate firms are not willing to limit their 
customer base to sellers or buyers exclusively. Consequently, if the customer is going to 
benefit from the notion of buyer's agency, then its integration into residential real estate sales 
must be effected in a manner which will essentially leave intact most of the existing structures 
while at the same time permitting the parties' belielS and expectations to be given legal and 
practical effect. This can be accomplished by that in the typical residential 
estate sale the sales agent is the agent of the buyer m all cases except where the buyer IS 
interested in pursuing the purchase of a listing from the inventory of the sales agent's :firm. In 
the latter case the agent would remain the agent of the seller. While this proposal is not 
without some drawbacks, it is a substantial improvement over the artificial and anti-consumer 
sub-agent rule. 
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